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THE INDIVIDUAL ‘WE’ NARRATOR 
 
ABSTRACT. The prevailing assumption in literary studies tends to be that a ‘we’ 
narrative voice is either that of an individual purporting to speak for a group, or that of a 
collective of people whose perspectives have coalesced into a unified one. Recent work 
on social agency across the cognitive humanities suggests another way of understanding 
what might be conveyed by such a ‘we’. Social cognition research shows that individuals 
can have their capacities changed and enhanced when they interact with others, and 
suggests that ‘we-representations’ in the individual mind may result from the 
transformative effects of interaction. In this paper, we draw on a specific instance of 
storytelling in the plural, William Faulkner’s ‘A Rose for Emily’, to articulate a theory of 
this ‘individual we’, and to show its potential in refining our understanding of ‘we’ 
narratives. We also propose that in future research the interdisciplinary study of the ‘we’ 
could engage with insights from literature as well as from philosophy and science. 
 




The use of a ‘we’ narrator has been a persistent feature of the literary tradition since what is generally 
thought to be the first instance, Joseph Conrad’s The Nigger of the ‘Narcissus’ (1897). In that story, a 
group of sailors is sometimes described as ‘they’ and sometimes joins the narrative voice to tell the 
story as a ‘we’. Subsequent examples use the ‘we’ as narrator throughout such as, most influentially, 
William Faulkner’s ‘A Rose for Emily’ (1930). More recently, Jeffrey Eugenides’ The Virgin Suicides 
(1993), Lloyd Jones’s The Book of Fame (2000), Kate Walbert’s Our Kind (2004), and Joshua 
Ferris’s Then We Came to the End (2007) have shown different ways in which first-person plural 
storytelling can prove effective. We take this to be partly a matter of semantics, in that the English 
pronoun ‘we’ can have different meanings and it can be used in places where ‘I’ and ‘you’ would 
more normally be used. An example of the former would be the ‘royal we’, and of the latter, a 
scenario where a teacher says to a class that ‘we’re going to do a difficult test today’; in both cases 
there need not be any implication of joint activity.  
In this paper, we do not purport to offer a semantic theory of ‘we’, though we will operate on the 
assumption that the first person plural pronoun is polysemous, and we will make this assumption 
explicit when appropriate. We treat ‘we’ mostly as a matter of pragmatics, in that what matters is what 
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is communicated in context. Following a long-standing tradition in social theory and psychology, the 
prevailing approach in literary critical studies is that, when a narrator says ‘we’, the pronoun 
expresses the voice of a group of people whose perspectives have coalesced into a unified one. The 
collective plural is taken to convey the sense of common purpose experienced by individuals when 
their perspectives are subsumed into the point of view of the group. This kind of ‘we’ signals 
identification with crowds and publics, political and cultural entities, which define collective forms of 
social existence for the individuals involved. The group perspective can apply whether or not there is 
an element of physical immediacy to group membership: even at a distance, the ‘we’ is felt, and the 
social dimension of thought and agency always impinges. To appreciate this dimension, however, is 
not to say that people’s ‘we-perspective’ on things is primarily, if not uniquely, the perspective of the 
groups they belong to at any given time. There is always a ‘we’ behind an ‘I’, but it can also be the 
case that ‘we’, really, is an ‘I’.  
Research across the cognitive humanities has defined a very different kind of ‘we’, in which the 
shared knowledge, emotions, thoughts, intentions, and preferences expressed in the first person plural 
pronoun are mental states of the individuals involved, rather than somehow a property of the group.1 
This could speak to a variety of situations. Consider, for example, the case of a solo traveller on a 
delayed flight texting to a friend ‘we’ll be setting off soon, thank goodness’. Surely there is a group of 
people sitting in the plane, waiting to take off, and the traveller may feel that s(he) is speaking for 
them. What is conveyed by use of ‘we’ here, however, is not the collective sense of a perspective 
shared by the group (if any). The experience of a shared perspective is individuated and private, it 
speaks to individual difference rather than collective commonality, yet it retains some element of 
sociality that urges use of the collective pronoun. Similarly, a participant in a meeting might think or 
say that ‘we have been persuaded to vote in favour by the argument from the final speaker’. Using 
‘we’ rather than ‘I’ need not speak to the merged minds of the group as there is no group perspective 
to report on collectively. But it could be more than just an aggregation of ‘Is’ having some common 
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goal; it could convey the social aspect of being persuaded for the individual, and the changes to 
individual experience that sociality entails. 
These examples show that there are social situations where the collective pronoun is best thought 
of as speaking for traits and perspectives of the individual agent, not the group. This observation 
intersects with a longer tradition of interest in ‘we’-intentionality, pursued by philosophers and 
scientists keen to capture the point that, when people do things together, interaction will have a 
transformative effect on the way they come to see and experience things individually.2 Notice the shift 
in focus: perspectives change as people interact, not in the sense that the collective perspective of a 
group comes into being and becomes the individual’s, but because if any things are experienced and 
enacted inter-subjectively, their being experienced and enacted together becomes part of the 
perspective that each person has on them.3 This is the sense in which the collective pronoun is used to 
indicate an individual form of social existence. We speak ‘as a we’ because we are acting together, 
after all, but the point is that our going through something together makes it the case that we now are, 
each individually, in a different position to where we were before interacting. The resulting view of 
the ‘we’—no longer a collective, but an ‘individual we’—offers a different paradigm for 
understanding ‘we’-narratives. The ‘we’-narrator can be seen neither as the isolated voice of an 
individual speaking for others, nor as the collective voice of a group of people acting in unison, but 
rather as expressing the differentiated state that arises in the mind of an individual attuning to the 
minds and bodies of other individuals in the course of interaction.  
In this interdisciplinary essay, we offer a novel account of plural storytelling, showing that the 
‘individual we’ can give us another way of characterizing the intuitions and observations made by 
authors. The overarching goal is to define a rigorous concept of the ‘we’ that nevertheless retains 
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fundamental insights about the importance of sociality in determining the scope and exercise of 
mental activity at the individual level. In so doing, we aim at bringing together strands of research in 
narratology, that is, the study of narrative structure and conventions, and cross-disciplinary work on 
sociality involving both analytic philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. There are obvious 
shared interests with work on empathy, sympathy, and inter-subjectivity, in literary analysis as well as 
in phenomenology, but our focus here is on the perspective to and from which the ‘we’ speaks, rather 
than the experiential nature of the exchange of information and its consequences.4 Our impetus 
derives from a commitment to parsimonious accounts of the ontology of mind and agency as an 
alternative to dynamic accounts of merged and enactive models of the social mind. 
In Section 2 we will set out the prevailing approaches in literary criticism, focusing especially on 
the work of narratologists Uri Margolin and Brian Richardson. In the third section, we will define the 
‘individual we’, establishing its essential characteristics and some key emerging and open questions in 
research on ‘we’-representations. We will then engage in a close reading of some passages of ‘A Rose 
for Emily’ in Section 4. Faulkner’s story is not a straightforward instantiation of the ‘individual we’. 
If he has any theory of this kind, it can only be reconstructed indirectly and holistically in the course 
of his story-telling. However, some passages are illuminated by an interpretation of ‘we’ as a fact 
about the minds of an individual, especially at the story’s climax. We propose this approach could 
improve understanding of the ways in which, not just Faulkner, but other authors narrate phenomena 
of plural agency in ‘we’ fictions. The individual ‘we’ narrator can be identified in many fictions, so 
our proposal has the programmatic aim to suggest an agenda for rethinking the canon of ‘we’ 
literature. In this vein, in a final, brief discussion of future directions in research, we also suggest that 
the study of complex literary depictions of the formation of ‘we’-perspectives could usefully 
complement the clear but constrained achievements of empirical studies and thought experiments on 
sociality. 
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2 Writing in the Plural 
The first-person plural pronoun can be used to mean different aspects of social interaction. The 
ordinary meaning is that it takes at least two individuals for a fact, a thought, an action, or a story, to 
count as social. This intuitive understanding of ‘we’ as implying a plural subject has informed studies 
of society across a wide range of disciplines concerned with social behaviour, in philosophy, 
psychology, and literary critical scholarship. Usually, the point of a narrator saying ‘we’ in the tone of 
voice of collective discourse is to invite us to realize that groups can have a perspective of thought 
and action that is different from the individualities that make it up. Along these lines, recent work in 
narratology has identified the need to develop a vocabulary and a more complex approach with which 
to capture the special characteristics of ‘we’-narrators.
5
 However, scholarly accounts of ‘we’-narrators 
thus far have been divided as to how to capture the distinctive features of thinking shared by members 
of a ‘we’. In this section, we identify two patterns of interpreting uses of ‘we’ in literary criticism, and 
provide a framework for our proposal in the next section.  
In a foundational essay from 1996, Uri Margolin surveyed the field of ‘we’-narratives and 
described its key characteristics.6 His presumption is that there cannot truly be a collective voice, 
merged minds expressed by a merged voice, except in the chorus of Greek drama, so the prose fiction 
‘we’ is used in a distributive sense. The ‘we’ narrator gives voice to nothing but the single perspective 
of an individual speaking on behalf of others. This leads to a focus on the relationship between the 
speaking individual and the group, and the way in which that single voice represents other members. 
Margolin goes on to question why such narratives are not more common, and to speculate why they 
may never be. This may, he argues, be due to the ambiguous nature of the scope of ‘we’, which can 
involve, in a fluid way, varying sets and subsets, including (or not) the speaker and the reader. (This 
varies somewhat from language to language: English makes no pronominal distinction between a ‘we’ 
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that includes or excludes ‘you’ the hearer, so this fluidity is inbuilt.7) It may also be related to what 
Margolin calls the ‘mental access issue’: it can be difficult to explain and justify the knowledge that a 
‘we’-narrator has of what is in other minds, and this may make it hard for readers to engage with the 
story. 
Other critics have put forward a remarkably different interpretation of first-person plural agency. 
Some have questioned whether the rarity of ‘we’-narratives is the result of inherent qualities, and see 
it as a phenomenon which arises when the cultural and political circumstances are appropriate. 
Fictions in the ‘we’ may not be so strange, after all; they just require the right conditions to make 
them appealing and meaningful in context. Brian Richardson is among the critics who have seen ‘we’-
narrators as means of exploring the political and ideological scenarios in which group thoughts and 
sensibilities coalesce.
8
 A similar pattern is evident in work on post-colonial novels, writing post-9/11, 
and feminist fiction.9  
Critics supporting this view of the ‘collective we’ deny that the rarity of ‘we’-narrators is 
inevitable, though they do acknowledge their experimental qualities. It may be that this makes them 
apt forms in which to represent marginalized group thinking, and indeed to point at the complexities 
of the cognitive aspects of ‘we’. Richardson notes that Alan Palmer’s Social Minds in the Novel, a 
wide-ranging study of ‘intermental’ phenomena as they arise in fiction, touches only briefly on ‘we’-
narrators, and tends to focus on the classic realist tradition.10 In this respect, Richardson differs from 
Palmer by focusing on the innovative character of ‘we’-narrative technique, taking ‘literary 
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playfulness and creativity [… to] represent the collective thoughts and sensibilities of marginalized 
groups that have formed close bonds’.11  
Such communal voices, however, can be elusive. The instability of the literary ‘we’ might follow 
from the author’s recognition of the difficulty of capturing the tension between the element of 
collectivity which is inherent in the ‘meeting’ of minds, and their merging into coherent unified 
thinking. Amit Marcus, for example, has noted that first person plural narrators ‘differ in the group’s 
stability and cohesion’ and in ‘the importance of the role attributed to the individual’.12 John Sutton 
and Evelyn Tribble have described similar dynamics in their study of Lloyd Jones’s The Book of 
Fame. They show how the dominant ‘we’ of that novel is composed of complex individuals who 
perform their own idiosyncratic versions of ‘we’-thinking, as well as interacting seamlessly at times in 
a skilled group activity (in this case, playing rugby).13 In her work on poetry, Bonnie Costello focuses 
on ‘the formation of a communal moment, one that can only be transient, perhaps, and that depends 
more on the rhetorical than the descriptive power of language’.14 For Costello, this particular 
‘communal moment’ is between the writer of the poem and its reader, but here, as in all these cases, 
there is again an interest in the transition, the conversion of ‘I’ to ‘we’, the premise being that the 
perspectives of individuals become merged. Her The Plural of Us takes the work of W.H. Auden as a 
particularly fraught case of the use of ‘we’ in poetry: in times of political anxiety, Auden explores the 
possibilities and problems of community through the different manners in which he speaks of 
togetherness. Costello displays a flexible understanding of the ‘we’ that can reach out towards the 
transformed experience of individuals.15 
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These scholars have explored nuances relating to the collective first-person voice in literature, and 
have hinted at interesting territory between an approach to the narrative ‘we’ in terms of group 
identity, and Margolin’s emphasis on the singular form of the collective plural. For Margolin, the fact 
that we say ‘we’ to indicate some form of collective agency is no evidence that the minds of people 
have become merged in the course of interaction: the spoken pronoun ‘we’ stands for one mind 
making inferences about other minds, and proffering them. For Richardson and others, instead, there 
is at least the possibility of a unity achieved by the members of a plurality. What this unity amounts 
to, and the level at which it can best be described, remain to be settled, given the seemingly inherent 
instability of the first-person plural pronoun; however, the ‘collective we’ speaks to the commonality 
of representations shared by individual minds when they operate as one. In the context of our essay, 
we suggest that these two sets of claims can be seen as the opposite ends of a spectrum of uses 
ranging from—for lack of better terms—individualistic to collectivist meanings of ‘we’. There is in 
fact a great deal of interesting territory between the two poles, wherein interaction does not imply 
collectivity, and the denial of collectivity does not devalue interaction. As we will argue in the next 
section, work in cognate fields has defined properties of an ‘individual we’ that sits in this territory, 
and offers the possibility of a productive rethink of particular ‘we’-narrators. 
 
3 Thinking as a Plural 
Elizabeth Bishop’s poem ‘The Moose’ describes an encounter between a bus full of people and the 
‘grand, otherworldly’ animal of its title.16 The narrating voice never actually says ‘I’, but at the 
beginning it suggests a solitary passenger as the speaker of the poem, watching as the bus moves 
through the landscape without taking significant account of the perspectives of the other travellers. 
This changes when a woman gets onto the bus and ‘regards us amicably’ (l. 78): the new arrival seems 
to catalyse a sense of inter-subjective experience in the speaker, and from this point on, first-person 
plural pronouns arise readily. The sight of the moose suddenly awakens the passengers and brings 
about a ‘sweet / sensation of joy’ (ll. 155-156). The experience is shared, as hinted by use of ‘we’, yet 
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there is a fundamental difference between this use and the twofold characterization of the ‘we’ 
sketched in the previous section. 
It cannot be categorically stated that this turn to ‘we’ could not be a representation of merged 
minds, a collective response of everyone on the bus. However, Bishop gives at least two hints that this 
is a matter of individual transformation, that the ‘we’ speaks to a state of mind – a perspective, an 
experience, a way of seeing things – that is a feature of the individual sharing it with others. One key 
moment comes in the three-line section ‘Why, why do we feel / (we all feel) this sweet / sensation of 
joy?’ (ll. 154-156). The bracketed phrase could suggest assertion, but seems more like a test and an 
acknowledgement of the fact that the emotions caused by the moose have equivalents felt by the other 
members of the group. Such a test would presumably not be necessary if this was genuinely a group 
mind. The speaker has become aware of the ‘meeting of minds’ taking place when the passengers each 
individually see this ‘grand, otherworldly’ animal, and the experience of seeing the moose together is 
enhanced, or just different, as a result.  
Another interesting moment for determining the nature of the poem’s ‘we’ comes when it is stated 
that ‘by craning backward / the moose can be seen’ (ll. 163-164). The passive construction, ‘can be 
seen’, draws a little extra attention to the technicality of the perception involved. It is perhaps most 
feasible to think of this as indicating that the speaker can participate in the continued sight of the 
moose because at least some of the passengers can ‘by craning backward’, literally see it. It does not 
particularly matter whether the speaker is one of them or not, because between them they have access 
to the result of an experience that it is there. Thus this moment, too, contributes to the poem’s 
depiction of an individual whose perspective is changed and enhanced by participating in an 
experience along with the minds and bodies of others. 
We contend that ‘we’ in ‘The Moose’ is a label for a distinct form of social existence having to do 
with the ‘meeting’ of individual minds, rather than a property of collectivities acting in unison or 
agents in isolation. All of us – the passengers and the reader, too, or so Bishop seems to suggest - just 
happen to be witnesses to an unplanned event in the theatre of our own mind, and body, which 
however comes with a distinctive feel, a sense that we’re living in the moment both individually and 
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socially. If we imagine the people on the bus, each doing their own things, some asleep, others 
playing with thoughts, it will become clear that the coming into focus of a moose is an intensely 
private, individual experience, one that does not require collective identification for its occurrence. 
The experience being shared is not a matter of solipsistic entertainment either, one that could be 
described as common to all and reported on as a ‘we’-experience. Bishop’s ‘we’, as in ‘we all feel’, 
implies that what we each individually feel, depends on us seeing the moose together - that its having 
been seen by all of us, together, is what makes my experience of it, or your experience, or anyone’s, 
really, the kind of experience that it is. The experience is shared in precisely this way, that the moose 
is experienced inter-subjectively. What makes the ‘sweet / sensation of joy’ shared, is not the fact that 
there is just a common object in sight, but that experience of it as such incorporates the perspectives 
of all. We call it a ‘we-perspective’ to capture the sense in which one’s mental life and experience of 
the world becomes inter-subjectively constituted by taking account of others’.17 However, the ‘we-
perspective’ is now predicated on individual-level experiences in the mind of the single agent, or ‘we-
representations’. 
Several concepts need careful unpacking and raise important questions for our proposal. If the 
collective pronoun can be a label for a form of social existence that pertains to individuals, why, then, 
call the sensation of joy felt by a person a ‘we-perspective’? Further, what does it mean to say that the 
way in which we each individually come to see things in the world is the result of an inter-subjective 
process, whereby the perspectives of the people involved are integrated, yet, differentiated? Let us 
turn to recent work in philosophy and cognitive research for an answer, and reconstruct the 
motivations for proposing a nuanced view of the conditions that must obtain for people to think and 
act ‘as a we’. To begin with, the concept of a mental representation held by a person in the first-
person plural, is known to philosophers working on so-called ‘we-intentionality’ from a classic 
problem of social philosophy. The problem received a first compelling formulation in Durkheim’s 
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treatment of social facts.18 Since social facts emerge from the interaction of individuals, the question 
arises as to how to account for their inter-subjective force in influencing the behaviour of people in 
terms of the resources that we employ in understanding individual personal attitudes. The challenge 
proved hard to meet, and many solutions have been put forward.  
Following in Durkheim’s steps, the philosopher Wilfrid Sellars19 posited a sui generis type of state 
in the minds of individuals, or ‘we-intention’, to avoid making appeal to the controversial notion of a 
collective consciousness. A ‘we-intention’ is to be conceived as ‘an intention that is not the merely 
subjective possession of an individual, but an intention had as a member of a group that constitutes 
us’ (emphasis not ours).20 ‘We’-intentionality has since become an umbrella concept for the capacity 
of minds to represent and experience things collectively, ‘as a we’, that is, to have collective 
intentionality.21 The concept has then appeared across a wide range of philosophical themes and 
styles, from analytic discussions of social ontology to phenomenological accounts of subjectivity.22 
Despite their diversity, these approaches share a Sellarsian insight: instead of socializing the mental 
by positing some sort of group mind, one can mentalize the social by showing that there is a ‘we’ 
dimension to the individual mind. This dimension captures an individual form of social existence, 
exemplified by the idea that the thoughts and experiences of an individual can be constituted inter-
subjectively.  
This idea of individual-level thoughts and experiences shaped inter-subjectively is illuminated by 
the following example from cognitive research. For a long time, traditional paradigms of social 
cognition were designed with the aim of testing the capacity of people to perform tasks which 
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required an individual agent to respond to stimuli about the behaviour of another agent. The 
methodological constraints of experimental inquiry ruled out the possibility of testing multiple 
subjects acting together in well-controlled laboratory conditions. Instead, the subjects would be 
instructed to perform a task involving the exchange and processing of socially relevant information, 
while sitting alone in front of a computer screen. Taking a different direction of travel, several studies 
now show that, when two participants are instructed to perform a task together in direct interaction, as 
opposed to merely processing social information in solitary environments, they display patterns of 
behaviour which are qualitatively different from the patterns that they would exhibit outside of 
interactive dynamics.23 The point is that what matters for social cognition is not so much the number 
of people involved, being a plurality instead of a single agent, nor the content and type of information 
recruited by the agents, being salient in some socially relevant way, as the fact that the subjects are 
tested as they think and act together. 
What we take as the main lesson of both philosophical and cognitive-scientific discourses on the 
‘we’ is the following. There is a way of seeing things in the world which becomes available to 
individual agents through some sort of physical and mental interaction.24 The opening up of novel 
routes to knowledge and experience comes with a distinctive phenomenology, the sense that what 
individual agents take things to be is given to them, in thought and experience, collectively, as theirs 
(‘ours’)25. Seeing things ‘as a we’ thus generates the differences in behaviour observed in cognitive 
research. In this context, the notion of a ‘we-representation’ is employed to refer to mental states 
which encompass information about others’ perspectives as well as those of the individual agents 
themselves in inter-action.26 Notice, not just action per se, but the coming together of minds sets the 
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conditions for them to operate socially—i.e. the inter-active manner in which the minds and bodies of 
individual agents align as they exchange and process information back and forth, gradually and 
dynamically.27 Therefore, interaction does not imply collectivity, yet the denial of collectivity does not 
devalue interaction: when a member of a team thinks exultantly ‘we won!’, this can be the result of 
undergoing the activity together with others, without the thought itself being shared by the group as 
one. 
Let us take stock of the discussion so far. The concepts of ‘we-intentions’ and ‘we-representations’ 
are delimited by disciplinary interests and theoretical demands of different kinds. There is, however, a 
common insight that brings them together and suggests a specific reading of ‘we’ that differs from the 
approaches presented in the previous section. By and large, philosophers of ‘we’-intentionality reject 
ontologically suspect claims about group minds. Likewise, scientists investigate the underpinnings of 
social interaction and cognition in tightly constrained experimental settings, where the focus is on the 
individual as the key unit of testing and measurement. Hence, the mechanisms and processes of ‘we-
intentionality’ are attributes of individual minds. Yet, still within a broadly individualistic framework, 
‘we-representations’ capture the fact that one’s perspective on things can have an element of inter-
subjectivity built into it. In fact, a key feature that unites Sellarsian approaches to ‘we-intentionality’ 
with developments in cognitive research is an understanding that the ‘we’ attests to a sense that one 
mind has had its perspectives and capabilities shaped in and changed by interaction with another, not 
that two or more interacting agents are having the very same thought and experience in unison.  
The phrase ‘two or more’ points to one further issue to acknowledge at this point. Many 
assumptions about ‘we’ in the cognitive humanities relate to dyads of people pursuing a common 
goal, such a painting a house or lifting a table together. Yet of course many uses of the pronoun relate 
to much larger group sizes. Perhaps ‘we-representations’ can be scaled up to larger numbers, and 
perhaps they cannot. There are practical difficulties in designing an experiment to test the question, 
and the idea of minds and bodies aligning dynamically does not extrapolate readily to such open-
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ended categories as ‘British’ or ‘historians’ (about which an individual might nevertheless say ‘we’ in 
some scenarios). Some studies maintain a distinction between categories, expressing larger social 
structures and affiliations, and what one might refer to as groups, meaning small-scale clusters of 
people, such as dyads, whose shared identity is grounded in dynamic interactions which can be 
observed locally and tested empirically.28 One response to these difficulties is offered by Gallagher 
and Tollefsen as they develop what they call a ‘narrative theory’ of the ‘we’. In their account, 
different forms of shared agency, from dyads to nations, are given stability and depth by similar 
processes mental processes that are narrative in character.29 Another solution to the problem of scale is 
to suggest that our closest contacts within larger groups, and the experience of aligning with them as a 
subset of the whole, are important parts of category membership: close connections to only a few 
people might be crucial to an individual’s experience of the ‘we’ of ‘British’ or ‘historians’.  
This is something that is hard to confirm or deny beyond the intuitive level, but it is an issue that 
can arise in fictions such as Faulkner’s ‘A Rose for Emily’. In the discussion of the story that follows, 
we will be attentive both to ways in which it is illuminated by new ideas about the ‘we’, and to ways 
in which it may illuminate the difficulties involved in defining the characteristics of the individual 
‘we’. 
 
4 ‘A Rose for Emily’ 
The predominant narrative voice of William Faulkner’s short story ‘A Rose for Emily’ (1930) is a 
‘we’. In accordance with the two prevailing approaches in literary criticism, outlined in Section 2, it 
often seems feasible to take the narrating voice ‘we’ as the voice of a single individual speaking on 
behalf of the group, truly or falsely. Whether the group has a distinctive perspective on things, and 
what the perspective is, does not really matter, since it is the way in which the individual takes the 
group to see things that the relevant ‘we’ expresses. Uri Margolin sees this story as a case where the 
speaker’s pronoun is a hybrid of the “we” sayer’s own immediate sense experiences and of the 
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presumed experiences ascribed to the co-focalisers by the speaker on the basis of their public actions 
and statements’ (p. 122).
30
 Alternatively, it is possible to see the ‘we’ as representative of the thoughts 
and values of the town of Jefferson, the voice of a group mind reacting in unison to the life story of 
Emily Grierson. It surely has taken some interaction between the single individuals for them to 
become a ‘we’ and have a unified perspective, but the pronoun could capture the perspective of the 
‘we’ only, while the individual’s perspective is lost in the collective. 
As was set out in Section 3, there is a way of thinking about the meaning of ‘we’ that is both 
individual and interactive. The concept of an ‘individual we’ is not simply an arbitration between the 
two prevailing views of ‘we’-narrators; it offers a different and new framework in which to approach 
such stories. This kind of ‘we’ comes into view at the climax of Faulkner’s story. Emily Grierson has 
poisoned her lover Homer Barron, kept his body in her house as it decayed, and shared its bed. Here 
Faulkner’s ‘we’ becomes significantly less unified for a moment: 
 
Then we noticed that in the second pillow was the indentation of a head. One of us 
lifted something from it, and leaning forward, that faint and invisible dust dry and 




This is the only use of ‘one of us’ in the story. The phrase, and the scene in general, invite us to think 
about what ‘we’ denotes and how ‘we’ came to notice and to bear witness to this tiny but decisive 
piece of evidence. (In this respect it resembles the line ‘by craning backward / the moose can be seen’ 
in Bishop’s poem discussed in Section 3: such nuanced moments provoke questions that lead to 
refinements in thinking about what is conveyed by respective instances of ‘we’.) Only a few Jefferson 
residents can feasibly have been present in the room that had been kept locked so long. Only a few—
perhaps fewer than would be standing there—could have leant forward to see something as tiny as a 
hair and to perceive its colour. Of these few, only one actually picks up the hair. As was suggested, it 
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could be that the ‘we’-speaker reveals itself to be the ‘one of us’ who undertakes the relevant action. 
Alternatively, one could say that the townspeople have merged their minds and they now perceive as 
one. 
Each interpretation captures important aspects of Faulkner’s complex narrative framework, yet 
neither quite fits the moment when Emily’s secret is revealed. To see why, let us first consider the 
case in which ‘we’ would express the voice of an individual speaking on behalf of the other people. 
There is an obvious way of understanding the meaning of ‘we’ in distributive terms. Action (as in ‘we 
saw a long strand of gray hair’) would be predicated on the individuals, so the ‘we’-narrator would be 
saying ‘we’ to mean that each and every agent saw the strand of hair individually. When someone 
says ‘we’ in the distributive sense, its use implies nothing more than there is a common object 
attended to by all parties, and that each of them is attending to it.32  In such a scenario, since the 
common object is salient, it would not make any difference in meaning if we read the climactic 
passage as implying that action were undertaken by a bunch of people unknown to one another, acting 
in parallel. ‘We’ still would have seen the strand of hair in the (distributive) sense that each of us did. 
Instead, it does make a difference if we interpret the climactic passage as suggesting that what ‘we 
saw’ – we saw it together, so to speak, not just as individuals acting serially. If ‘we saw’ the strand of 
hair together, then of course it is true to say without loss of meaning that each of us did; but the 
opposite is not. 
The vividness of interaction and intense sense of participation here suggest that there is more to 
this ‘we’-perspective than the perspective of a single individual whose voice says ‘we’ distributively 
as above. Faulkner may have wanted his narrator to say ‘we’ at this point in such a way as to convey, 
not the separate experiences had by each and every one of ‘us’ in front of a common object, but the 
inter-subjective character of the experience of seeing the strand of hair jointly. The phrase ‘one of us’ 
is telling: this is the thrust of ‘we’-intentionality, of the ‘we-as-a-group’ interpretation left out of a 
purely aggregative reading of ‘we’. Whether or not the ‘we’-speaker is taken to have been part of the 
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action scene, the fact that someone picked up the hair as ‘one of us’ has an impact on the way the 
moment is experienced and represented by all. 
If the ‘we’-speaker then says ‘we’ to express a ‘we’-perspective on things, does it stand for the 
perspective of the group as a whole? This seems like another inadequate explanation. The emphasis 
on the relationship of the ‘we’-speaker to the group points towards a kind of ‘we’-experience that 
goes beyond the features of a ‘collective we’. This relationship comes into heightened focus as a 
result of at least one important uncertainty. Faulkner momentarily leaves the first person plural when 
referring to ‘the’ (not ‘our’, or ‘my’) nostrils while describing the smell in the room. This makes us 
think a bit more about whose senses have borne witness, and how that witness is pooled among the 
group. The ‘we’-speaker shares the relevant moment of perception, but the constituency of the group 
and the specifics of the involvement remain unclear. The attention on the individual’s questionable 
presence but vivid access gets across that the speaker is not merged into the group, so (s)he is not 
speaking for a collective mind. The focus is on how the individual’s differentiated perspective is 
shaped through interaction with others, and changed by it, until it becomes somewhat shared. Hence, 
the use of ‘we’ suggests a mental state of the single speaker whose perspective on things becomes 
aligned with others rather than undifferentiated and collectivized: an ‘individual we’.  
To understand this crucial instance of the narrative ‘we’, in light of the features that we have 
discussed in Section 3, we need to examine the framework from which Faulkner’s version of a ‘we-
representation’ emerges, that is, the use of the pronoun in the rest of ‘A Rose for Emily’. It should be 
noted that Faulkner has not created a systematic study of ‘we’-thinking in this or other stories. The 
narrative ‘we’ is not unified or stable across its appearances; it is left to the reader to interpret which 
agent the ‘we’-voice represents, whether it represents a group or, rather, an individual-level state of 
mind of the (‘we’-)speaker. Indeed, as Margolin shows, the fluid nature of ‘we’ extends to the groups 
it may invoke: he notices that most of Faulkner’s collective uses (unlike the one at the critical 
moment in Emily’s bedroom) lend themselves to a diachronic reading, and ‘we’ speaks to at least 
three different generations of members of the Jefferson community.
33
 However, amid this fluidity 
                                                     
33
 Margolin, ‘Telling Our Story’, 120.  
 18 
some key characteristics of Faulkner’s storytelling technique recur and persist throughout the story. 
We shall therefore proceed by focusing on these characteristics in order to show how Faulkner’s 
nuancing of the meaning of ‘we’ creates the conditions for something like an ‘individual we’ to arise 
at the end of the story. 
One way in which the relationships between individual(s) and group(s) can be approached is 
through the issue of witnessing. Readers are guided towards thinking about what it means to say ‘we’ 
by Faulkner’s subtle, scalar descriptions alongside statements of apparent fact (within the story-
world) about what ‘we’ saw. An omniscient narrator just knows things, but ‘we’ do not, which raises 
questions as to whether and how the narrative ‘we’ perceives aspects of the story. For example, when 
Emily dies, ‘we did not even know she was sick’, and yet it is recorded that ‘she died in one of the 
downstairs rooms, in a heavy walnut bed with a curtain, her grey head propped on a pillow yellow 
and moldy with age and lack of sunlight’.
34
 This could be a scene collated in retrospect, or even 
invented, but the process by which specific details become known is unclear; readers might wonder 
briefly who actually saw this, while also being fascinated by the unfolding revelations. Things are 
more subtle when the reader hears that, before her death, ‘we’ saw Emily ‘now and then’: this 
suggests an exchange of information between the minds spoken for by ‘we’.
35
 Any one of them 
might have seen her once or more, and may have heard explicitly about other sightings, but this kind 
of perception as ‘we’ comes across as a composite of inferences and extrapolations based on 
awareness of what others have seen. The point is that when we reach the moment of discovery in the 
climactic episode, readers are prepared to recognize the specialness of the involvement as a group 
and immediacy evoked by the ‘we’ at that moment, because the story has given other less intense 
and striking, but still questionable, versions of the pronoun to think through. 
Sometimes the story depicts a characteristic of Jefferson life that suggests an alternative 
explanation for the way in which the ‘we’-speaker finds out about Emily’s secret. It might simply be 
that news travels fast in Yoknapatawpha County, the fictional part of Mississippi where Faulkner set 
most of his explorations of Southern life. In the small town world the facts and some idea of what the 
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moment of perception was like could circulate very quickly by means of a network of person-to-
person gossip. Faulkner includes an incident of this sort when he describes the reaction of the ‘we’ to 
the strange encounter between Emily and a ‘druggist’ (i.e. a pharmacist). He sells her arsenic; she 
won’t tell him its planned use, and without any further indication as to how, ‘the next day we all 
said, “She will kill herself”‘.
36
 Private conversations do not always become public—we never find 
out what Emily said that made a Baptist minister refuse to offer any more moral guidance—but there 
is the potential for very rapid circulation.
37
 What ‘we’ need to know of the transaction with the 
druggist is simply factual (i.e. to conclude that she ‘will kill herself’, ‘we’ just need to know that she 
bought arsenic), but the things ‘we’ don’t know about the meeting with the minister, and what ‘we’ 
do know about the final revelation, have more arresting and emotional content. ‘News travels fast’ 
cannot be the whole story because it cannot account for the intense sense of participation, the 
distinctive feeling of ‘together-ness’ that we encounter at the point of the final revelation. By 
evoking, at times, a relatively mundane world of circulating gossip, Faulkner creates a contrast with 
the more psychologically interesting ways in which states of affairs and objects, like a strand of hair, 
can be thought about and experienced by individuals ‘as a we’. It is perhaps worth stressing that this 
richer ‘we’-perspective need not be ethically superior to the world of gossip; transformed though it 
may be at times by the perspectives it accesses, the ‘we’ of ‘A Rose for Emily’ never includes Miss 
Grierson or engages in productive sympathy with her plight. 
On the assumption that the narrative voice can speak to the individual mind of the ‘we’-speaker, 
another way to let this dimension emerge is to isolate instances of seemingly plural agency. For 
example, Faulkner gives indications as to how his ‘we’ should be construed by using a ‘they’ pronoun 
to separate certain groups from the narrative voice. There are distinctions according to age and 
gender—we hear of groups of ladies and older people who are at particular moments not included—
but no definitive clarification of which group the ‘we’ speaks for. This makes the use of the pronoun 
at the crucial final moment distinctively dynamic and full of potential. The most important difference 
between the ‘they’ and the ‘we’ arises in relation to the kind of impact these pronominal agents have 
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in the story. Just before the climax, there is a stark contrast between what ‘we’ know, and how ‘they’ 
act: 
 
Already we knew that there was one room in that region above stairs which no one had 
seen in forty years, and which would have to be forced. They waited until Miss Emily 




This contrast between the ‘they’ that breaks down a door, and the ‘we’ that knows the consequences, 
stands usefully for a key definition of what ‘we’ do in ‘A Rose for Emily’. This definition is different 
from that of Brian Richardson, who says that ‘by the end of the story, the collective “we” does change 
and becomes an actor, physically present in the story’.
39
 Rather than taking concrete action, and thus 
fulfilling Richardson’s interpretation in terms of collective presence (though his term, ‘actor’, does 
not necessarily entail something as drastic as breaking down a door), Faulkner’s ‘we’ is typically 
portrayed throughout the story as the ‘we’-attitude of an individual knowing, perceiving, 
remembering, feeling, and believing. Even the picking up of a hair is devolved to ‘one of us’: the ‘we’ 
typically denotes a set of things that happen in and to the minds of individuals. 
This general characteristic becomes most pointed in the final climatic moment. First there is a 
moment of intense perception, as ‘we just stood there’ staring at Homer Barron’s decayed body.
40
 
Then, there is the emergence of ‘one of us’, which enables a single hair to be picked up, and next the 
precise close-up vision of a limited ‘we’ (perhaps a subset of ‘we’) that recognizes the hair’s 
significance. This moment, the culmination of a thread of thoughtful investigation into the first person 
plural perspective that runs throughout the story, offers an arresting image of a mental state of one 
speaker which is enhanced by taking account of the perspectives of other agents in the course of 
interaction. This crucial ‘we’ is not a collective subject, merged in both thought and action. It seems 
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more like the result, in an individual speaker, of a sense of togetherness and the experience of shared 
involvement. 
 
5 Further Directions for Research 
The concept of the ‘individual we’ enables a fuller and finer grasp of the narrative technique in ‘A 
Rose for Emily’, and could do the same for other ‘we’-narratives (such as those named at the 
beginning of the essay) as well. As was discussed in Section 2, critical approaches tend to choose 
between the isolated individual and the merged collective when describing ‘we’-narrators, but many 
of the most interesting examples involve, at some stage, the sort of dialectic between individuality and 
interactivity seen in Faulkner’s story. These narrative techniques, many of which are more 
ambitiously extended and aim to represent more complex, and less realistic, social dynamics, would 
also be illuminated by an approach that focuses on the effects of  alignment for, and on, the individual 
in social settings. In some cases, it will be particularly important to consider the fictionality of the 
perspective being evoked in analysing uses of ‘we’ in social discourse. Whereas Faulkner’s narrative 
style can be thought of as an attempt to represent the experience of town life in the South, somewhat 
historically, other experimental versions of story-telling in the plural may aim more at enabling 
imaginary worlds than representing real ones.  
Recent developments in the philosophy and science of social cognition are providing new contexts 
in which to appreciate what can be conveyed by the word ‘we’. However, ‘A Rose for Emily’ is not a 
perfectly neat example of the directions of research noted in Section 3, fitting the criteria and entirely 
excluding other explanations for its characteristics. The story offers a picture of how the ‘individual 
we’ might arise fleetingly in the course of a series of complex events and interactions, while hinting at 
issues that are not frequently broached in philosophical and scientific accounts of ‘we’-intentionality. 
One question, for example, is whether goal-directed, intentional behaviour is the fundamental scenario 
in which social cognition operates, or whether social understanding and interaction are underpinned 
by an alignment of minds that depends on factors other than people having common goals and 
enacting them jointly. Faulkner’s story brings this into view by offering the ‘they act’ / ‘we know’ 
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distinction described above. While some of the ‘we’-narrator’s interventions in the world should be 
thought of as action in a broad sense, there is still a contrast between bluntly knocking down a door 
and the ongoing ‘feeling’, and ‘thinking’, and ‘knowing’ that something is the case for the people 
involved. It is not that ‘A Rose for Emily’ seems to arise from a concrete decision on the importance 
of action or alignment, but rather that the story brings the question into view and offers, within the 
bounds of the world it is depicting, a way of partially answering it. 
Something similar could be said in relation to the distinction between dyads, groups, and 
categories also described in Section 3. It is an open question, and one that does not yield readily to 
experiment, whether an ‘individual we’ can arise in similar ways in relation to different numbers and 
types of people. Faulkner’s shifting ‘we’ does not offer a consistent size or constitution of the group, 
nor does it offer a steady level of affiliation between the members, but it seems that his version of 
‘we’-experience is not limited to very small groups. Furthermore, since it is not even clear that the 
narrator is present in Emily’s room, and yet the speaker still identifies vividly (‘as a we’) with what 
happens there, it is suggested that the qualities of the ‘individual we’ may not depend on people being 
present in the same place. Co-presence is now an essential feature of experimenting and a pillar in 
theorizing about social cognition; and yet Faulkner produces a plausible depiction of how a ‘we’-
speaker may have its perceptions and perspective formed in interaction with others without 
(necessarily) immediate contact. Again, this does not emerge as a developed proposition, but the story 
affords consideration of nuances and possibilities in a lifelike, though unusual, environment. 
Novels and short stories with ‘we’-narrators may speak to the wider interdisciplinary field by 
portraying interactions within fictions that thematically shadow interactions tested in experiments or 
posited by philosophers. Imaginative licence may have enabled literary authors to portray detailed, 
vivid ideas of how a ‘we’ might arise, free from the constraints that govern cognitive scientists and 
philosophers, but gauging the value of such ideas will be no simple matter. However, there may be 
reasons why a particular field of philosophical and scientific enquiry is more or less open to insights 
from the direction of literature. In the case of the ‘individual we’, there are (at least) two. Firstly, there 
is the importance of language. The pronoun ‘we’ is a form in which to express, and to offer access to, 
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the mental state in question. It is also an obstacle, since the pronoun does not distinguish one kind of 
‘we’ from another, and the ‘we’-perspective being asserted may be an illusion. In these respects, and 
in general, the particular literary use of ‘we’ at stake in this essay is not significantly different from 
possible non-literary uses. However, the complex network of ‘we’ in Faulkner’s story provides a 
constantly varying encounter with the pronoun, and thereby with the subtleties of the underlying 
concepts, which traditional interpretations in literary criticism have failed to capture. 
Secondly, and more far-reachingly, there is an affinity between the ‘individual we’ and the 
reader’s encounter with the world through other eyes. Literature affords new representations of the 
world in a way that might bear on the fundamental capacity of individuals to have their perspectives 
on things shaped by, and changed in, the relevant meeting of minds. In both cases, there is an interest 
in the transformation of an individual’s mental environment by way of aligning with others’ views. At 
a general level, this analogy has nuances: for example, the ‘individual we’ posits transformative 
effects from interaction, but these arise differently in the individuals involved. This might resonate 
with an idea of literary experience in which, again, there are outcomes in terms of new perspectives 
on things being afforded to readers, but these are not identical in every reader. Readers often agree 
with one another as to what they are getting from fiction, but each representational and experiential 
response is unique. The key thing is that if some aspects of literature have more to offer the cognitive 
humanities than others—if their aspirations to insight are not equal—then the first-person plural 
narrator should be one of the more promising.
41
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